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Beyond Treble Damages:
Hanover Shoe and Direct Purchaser Suits
After Comes v. Microsoft Corp.
Adam Thimmesch*

ABSTRACT: In Comes v. Microsoft, the Iowa Supreme Court determined
that the Iowa Competition Law allows indirect purchasersuits. The court,
however, failed to clarify the impact of its ruling on defensive pass-on. As
such, it appears that antitrust violators may be subject to sextuple damages
in Iowa. While this result may have been unintended, it allows a new
approach to the problems of indirect purchaser suits. The Comes decision,
coupled with the damages provisions of Iowa Code section 553.12, grants
district court judges the discretion to craft remedies that more adequately
reflect the damages that antitrust violators cause. This discretion could help
to strengthen the deterrent effect of the Iowa Competition Law and maximize
the incentives of injuredparties to exercise their rights. While this system is
not a fix-all for the problems surroundingindirectpurchasersuits, it allows
Iowa to operate more effectively within the currentsystem.
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BEYOND TREBLE DAMAGES

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that indirect purchasers are not allowed to sue for antitrust injury under § 4
of the Clayton Act, a federal antitrust statute.' Since that decision in 1977,
states have debated about whether to give indirect purchasers the right to
sue under state antitrust laws. 2 Comes v. Microsoft Corp., a 2002 decision of the
Iowa Supreme Court, signaled Iowa's entrance into that debate. 3
In Comes, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that indirect purchasers have
the right to sue under the Iowa Competition Law, rejecting the rationale of
the Illinois Brick Court.4 This Note focuses on how Comes did more than
merely signal Iowa's entrance into the indirect purchaser debate; it
introduced a new dimension to it. Comes signaled the Iowa Supreme Court's
willingness to go beyond treble damages.-5 A brief hypothetical will illustrate
this aspect of Comes.
Imagine a manufacturer of pencils, Woodcorp. This company sells its
product to Intermediary Inc., an Iowa wholesaler, at an anticompetitive
price in violation of the Iowa Competition Law. 6 As a result of this activity,
Intermediary Inc. is overcharged by $250,000. Bic Sanford, the owner of an
Iowa City school supply store purchases all of these pencils from
Intermediary Inc., feels as though he has been injured by this overcharge,
and files a lawsuit against Woodcorp in Iowa state court. At trial, Bic Sanford
is successful in his claim and the jury finds Woodcorp liable for the full
$250,000. The judge, pursuant to statutory authority, 7 then trebles this
amount and enters judgment against Woodcorp for $750,000.

1. 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977).
2.
See generally Ronald W. Davis, Indirect PurchaserLitigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1997)
(discussing state responses to Illinois Brick).
3.
646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002).
4. Id. at 451.
5. Those not familiar with antitrust may summarily dismiss discussions of its issues as dull
and highly technical. The concepts of cross elasticity of supply and downward-sloping demand
curves hardly seem to grasp one's attention as quickly as sordid tales of inequitable sentencing
pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This Note, recognizing these difficulties,
attempts to present its antitrust discussion in a way that those not familiar with the doctrine can
easily understand its analysis and appreciate its importance in today's world.
6.
IOWA CODE §§ 553.1-14 (2003).
7. Id. § 553.12(2), (3). These code provisions give Iowa courts the authority to award
exemplary damages of up to two times the actual damages determined by the jury. Id. As such,
liability under these sections can reach up to treble damages.
8.
In overcharge cases, there are two alternatives for measuring damages: lost profits and
the overcharge. 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 394, at 521 (2d
ed. 2000). The overcharge method uses the difference between the price charged and the price
that would have been charged absent the illegal conduct. Id. Antitrust scholars advocate using
lost profits instead of the overcharge method. See id.
394 ("[T]he most commonly used
measure of damages, viz., the overcharge, is an ambiguous proxy for the actual damages
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Intermediary Inc. then brings suit against Woodcorp in Iowa state court
for the same overcharge. At trial, Woodcorp argues that the previous finding of
liability to Bic Sanford is a defense to this suit-it has already paid for the
overcharge. The judge feels constrained by Iowa law, however, and does not
accept this defense. After this second trial, the jury returns a verdict for
Intermediary Inc. and awards damages of $250,000. The judge then trebles
the jury's award and enters judgment against Woodcorp for another
$750,000. This brings Woodcorp's antitrust liability up to $1,500,000 for a
single overcharge of $250,000.
Could this happen? Yes. As noted above, Comes held that the Iowa
Competition Law allows indirect purchasers (such as Bic Sanford) to sue for
antitrust injury. 9 In that decision, however, the court failed to determine
whether monopolists (such as Woodcorp) could use this as a defense to suits
by direct purchasers (such as Intermediary Inc.). Thus, violators of the Iowa
Competition Law face the possibility of sextuple damages. 10
The lack of clarity about damages in Comes results in uncertainty for
direct purchasers that want to bring suit under the Iowa Competition Law.
Does defensive pass-on limit their recovery? This uncertainty seems likely to
deter some plaintiffs from seeking to enforce their rights under the Iowa
Competition Law-a result the Iowa Supreme Court clearly did not intend."

suffered."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 17.5 (1994) (stating that "[t]he difference between the price actually paid and
the competitive price is not necessarily the correct amount"). Under this theory, a pass-on
defense is inapplicable because the calculation of lost profits does not include an amount that
the direct purchaser would have passed on to consumers. Id
Despite the arguments supporting lost profits as a damages measure, plaintiffs and
courts still use overcharge. See Drug Mart Pharmacy v. Am. Home Prods., 296 F. Supp. 2d 423,
425-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (comprehensively analyzing the use of overcharge as a measure of
damages in antitrust cases); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 337, 344 (D. Mass. 2003)
("Overcharges, the 'difference between the actual price and the presumed competitive price
multiplied by the quantity purchased,' provide what the Supreme Court has long recognized as
the principal measure of damages for plaintiffs injured as customers.... ") (quoting In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 309 (E.D. Mich. 2001)); 1 ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 874 (5th ed. 2002) ("[T]he measure of
damages in a suit by a purchaser normally is the difference between the price the purchaser
paid and the price it would have paid absent the violation."); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES 183 (1996) ("When a direct purchaser from an illegal
monopolist sues, the obvious measure of damages is the overcharge."); HOVENKAMP, supra, §
17.5, at 603 ("Today the overcharge method of computing damages is well established."). Given
the continued use of overcharge as a measure of damages, this Note proceeds on an assumption
that the Iowa courts will have to address the availability of defensive pass-on.
9.
Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 441.
10. This result is not possible under federal law, given the Supreme Court's ruling in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), which bars indirect purchasers from bringing
suits for damages under the Clayton Act. Id. at 744-47.
11.
See Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 447 (showing concern that injured parties are allowed to
bring suit). In Comes, the Iowa Supreme Court held that "the Iowa Competition Law creates a
cause of action for all consumers, regardless of one's technical status as a direct or indirect
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The natural solution to this uncertainty, and the possibility for sextuple
damages, seems to be to allow the defensive use of pass-on. This Note
argues, however, that this response may not be the optimal solution in Iowa.
Given the debate over treble damages 12 and the legitimacy of Illinois Brick,'
the Comes decision may actually provide a good platform to test a new
approach to the "indirect purchaser problem."
In order to lay a framework for this approach, Part II of this Note gives a
brief introduction to the foundations of antitrust law and provides a cursory
explanation of pass-on liability and the economics involved in indirect
purchaser suits.' 4 Part III discusses the relevant federal law on indirect
purchaser suits and the Iowa antitrust statutes. Part IV of this Note discusses
the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Comes. Finally, Part V provides
criticism of that decision and looks at the present state of antitrust law in
Iowa. Particularly, Part V argues that because the court partially justified its
decision on the date of the Iowa Competition Law's enactment, Iowa courts
could prohibit defensive pass-on. This Note concludes by explaining the
benefits of such a system and how the Iowa Competition Law gives Iowa trial
courts the discretion that is necessary for this approach to be advantageous.

purchaser." Id. at 445. The court further showed concern that direct purchasers were not
bringing suits. Id. at 450 ("The fact that no direct purchaser has yet sued Microsoft for antitrust
violations suggests that no direct purchaser will do so."). Thus, the court concluded that "to
facilitate enforcement of the policies behind the Iowa Competition Law, indirect purchasers,
the real victims, must be authorized to bring a cause of action in state court." Id. This goal of
enforcement is inconsistent with deterring suits by injured direct purchasers.
12. See infra note 22 (describing the debate over the appropriateness of treble damages).
13. Other courts and commentators have since questioned the Supreme Court's ruling in
that case. See Bunker's Class Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 108-09 (Ariz. 2003) (discussing
the inapplicability of Illinois Brick), Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 449 (stating that the policy
considerations of Illinois Brick have not materialized); HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 16.6, at 570
(stating that there is "vehement" debate over whether the indirect purchaser rule is a good
one); Jeff Patterson, Comment, Microsoft Antitrust Litigation: Illinois Brick Defeats its Intended
Purpose,5J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 377, 397-98 (2001) (discussing flaws in Illinois Brick). See
generally Kevin J. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at
34.
14. The issues surrounding indirect purchaser suits have received heavy scholarly
attention. Thus, it is important to address at this point what this Note will not discuss. First, this
Note does not analyze the conflict between federal and state law as it relates to indirect
purchaser actions. Second, this Note does not offer any insight into the problem of multijurisdictional consolidation of actions. This Note is not concerned with the procedural
difficulties of state indirect purchaser actions, but rather with the Iowa Supreme Court's
inattention to substantive issues of Iowa antitrust law and the effects that may result.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAw: A (VERY) QUICKLOOK

Since 1950, when Congress codified the last of the major federal
antitrust provisions, 15 there has been considerable debate regarding the
theories and policies of the doctrine.' 6 Some commentators suggest that
Congress passed the antitrust laws to stop the unfair transfer of wealth from
consumers to monopolists.' 7 Others argue quite strongly that "[the only
legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer
welfare." 18 Under this theory, the concern is about the dead-weight social
losses of monopoly as opposed to the wealth transfer effect.' 9 Still others
advocate a role that protects competitors over consumer welfare .2
Despite the argument surrounding the purpose of federal antitrust law,
one thing is clear: the federal antitrust laws carry severe penalties. Section 4
of the Clayton Act provides for treble damages for any person injured by
violations of the antitrust laws.21 Thus, in an antitrust case, the jury
determines actual damages without notice of the treble damages provision,
and then the judge trebles that amount when entering judgment. As such,

15.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 2.1, at 50 (listing when Congress passed the major
antitrust laws); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 19-48 (1993)(same). Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Clayton Act in 1914, the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, and the CellerKefauver Amendments to the Clayton Act in 1950. HOvFNKAMP, supra note 8, § 2.1, at 50.
16.
See BORK, supra note 15, at 17 (explaining the different goals of antitrust law); see also
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE: CASES,
MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1-17 (5th ed. 2003) (same).
17. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 13 (citing Robert H. Lande, Wealth ransfers
as the Originaland Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 65 (1982)). This occurs due to the reallocation of consumers' surplus to the monopolist. See
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS § 10.4 (5th ed. 2001)
(explaining this concept).
18. BORE, supra note 15, at 51.
19.
See id. at 111 ("[T]he income distribution effects of economic activity should be
completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity."). For indepth discussion of this point of view, see id. at 107-12 (concluding that "[tjhere is every
reason... to conclude that courts should ignore income distribution in deciding antitrust cases
and stick to the criteria of the consumer welfare model").
20. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 3 (explaining that the Supreme Court
advocated such a role for antitrust in cases such as United States v.Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
275-77 (1966), and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)). In Brown Shoe, the
Court stated that "we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344. Perhaps one has heard this argument from someone who
condemns retailers like Wal-Mart for ruining small town "mom and pop" stores.
21.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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recovery in antitrust cases can be very large. 22 But why do we care about
burdening antitrust violators with such large liability; do they not deserve it?
While many may have little concern for antitrust robber barons, overdeterrence is a critical problem in antitrust law. Actions that may appear to
violate the antitrust laws on their face, such as extreme price reductions or
product innovation, may in fact be vigorous competition. 4 It stands to
reason that if businesses face severe liability for such actions, competition
may be stifled. Whatever one believes the goals of antitrust are, this concern
warrants consideration.
Deterring socially beneficial behavior (such as increased innovation)
may not be tolerated. Absent innovation, we would be stuck in a world of
horse-drawn carriages, VHS movies, and un-sliced bread. Innovation is
socially beneficial and as such, over-deterrence of competition should be a
major factor in any analysis of antitrust problems.' 5 The Iowa Supreme
26
Court's decision in Comes v. Microsoft Corp. clearly implicates this concern.
However, before an analysis of the Iowa Supreme Court's decision, a
discussion of some basic economic concepts in the context of "pass-on" is
necessary.

22. For example, in Conwood Corp. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003), the jury award totaled $1.05 billion. There is debate, however,
as to whether treble damages are the appropriate level of damages. See Robert H. Lande, Are
Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO Sr. LJ. 115, 118 (1993) (contending
that "antitrust damages awards are approximately equal to, or less than, the actual damages
caused by antitrust violations"); see also Thomas Greene, Should Congress Preempt State Indirect
Purchaser Laws? Counterpoint: State Indirect Purchaser Remedies Should be Preserved, ANTITRUST,
Fall/Winter 1990, at 25, 27 (stating that federal remedies do not make antitrust violations
unprofitable); Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 233, 257 (1988)
(suggesting that treble damages are too low). Professor Lande notes that treble damages may be
too much in some instances, while they are appropriate for others. Lande, supra, at 115-16.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 17.1 (explaining the correlation between enforcement
23.
and deterrence).
24. What may appear as product design changes intended to exclude rivals may merely be
technological advancement. See Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir.
1979) (explaining that Plaintiff's claim of "technological manipulation" failed because
"equivalent function at lower cost certainly represents a superior product from the buyer's
point of view"). Similarly, what appears to be anticompetitive pricing may actually be legitimate
price competition. Id. (stating that "price and performance are inseparable parts of any
competitive offering").
25. This is not to say that antitrust laws should not be enforced. There is a large difference
between over-deterrence and non-enforcement. While this line may not be easy to draw, a
conscious awareness is very important to sound antitrust reasoning.
26. 646 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2002) (holding that indirect purchasers are allowed to sue
under the Iowa Competition Law).
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PASS-ON AND THE ECONOMICS OFINDIRECTPURCHASER SUITS

1.

Indirect and Direct Purchasers

Indirect purchasers are those purchasers who have an intermediary
between themselves and the monopolist.17 Stated differently, "an indirect, or
downstream, purchaser is one who purchases a price-fixed product from" an
intermediary.2 8 In the example presented in the introduction, Bic Sanford
was an indirect purchaser because he purchased the pencils indirectly from
Woodcorp, through Intermediary Inc.29 We, as citizens, are indirect
purchasers when we go to the grocery or retail store. Hence, this is a familiar
concept-it reflects a role that most of us have played our entire lives.
Direct purchasers, in contrast, are parties who purchase directly from
the alleged monopolist?30 In the example in the introduction, Intermediary
Inc. was a direct purchaser because it purchased the pencils directly from
Woodcorp."1 Further, Bic Sanford was a direct purchaser from Intermediary
Inc?. 2
2.

The Pass-On Defense3

In a suit by a direct purchaser against a monopolist, the defendant34
monopolist may be inclined to use what is called the "pass-on defense."
This defense is a theory by which the monopolist claims that the direct
purchaser's antitrust injuries were mitigated because she was able to pass on
any overcharge to her customers.35 Assume, for example, that Woodcorp
overcharged Intermediary Inc. by one dollar per unit. In theory,

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 281 (3d ed. 1999).
28. Thomas Greene & Patricia A. Conners, State Antitrust Enforcement, 1427 P.L.I. CORP. L.
& PRAc. 809, 833 (2004).
29.
See supra Part I (discussing this example).
See HOVENKAMP, supranote 27, at 281 (highlighting the difference between an indirect
30.
and direct purchaser); see also Greene & Conners, supra note 28, at 833 ("A direct purchaser is
one who purchases directly from a price-fixer.").
27.

31.
See supraPart I (discussing this example).
32.
See supra Part I (discussing this example).
The pass-on defense rests on a theory of "overcharge damages" that has been
33.
denounced by prominent antitrust scholars. For a critique of this theory and its use, see supra
note 8. As discussed in that footnote, while scholars may not accept the overcharge method, its
use by courts is well-established.
34.
See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1968).
35. W. Donald McSweeney, Damages, Including Proof and Causation: The "Passing-On"
Defense, in TREBLE DAMAGE AcTIONS 167, 179 (1970). For a discussion of how passing-on occurs
in various market structures, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 16.6a. For further discussion of
the economic theory of passing-on, see generally Robert Cooter, Passing On the Monopoly
Overcharge: A Further Comment on Economic Theory, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1523 (1981); Robert G.
Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passingon the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis,
128 U. PA. L. REV.269 (1979); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing
On: A Reply to Harrisand Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980).
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Intermediary Inc. could pass on this cost increase to indirect purchasers in
the form of higher prices. Thus, the indirect purchasers may face higher
prices of up to one dollar per unit.36 This would be an example of a 100%
pass-on. A monopolist claiming a 100% pass-on would contend that the
direct purchaser had in fact suffered no antitrust injury because she had
passed on any price increase to her customers and thereby recovered any
loss. This would effectively end the direct purchaser's suit against the
monopolist.
One-hundred percent pass-on is not certain, however, because direct
purchasers may not be able to increase the price of their product by the
entire overcharge at no cost to themselves. In response to a price increase,
indirect purchasers may go to another supplier. Alternatively, even if the
indirect purchaser has no choice of suppliers, she may choose to avoid the
8
overcharge by not purchasing the product at all. When applying this to the
Woodcorp example, it is easy to see that customers may not be willing to pay
an increased price for the pencils because there are readily available
substitutes, perhaps fountain or ball-point pens.
Further affecting a direct purchaser's ability to pass on all of an
overcharge, to the extent that the demand curve for pencils is downward
sloping,39 a direct purchaser will lose sales at any increased price. If the

36. If the intermediary sets prices as a fixed percentage of its costs, the price may actually
rise by an amount greater than the one dollar overcharge.
37. This, of course, assumes that another supplier is available and that the transaction
costs of finding and buying from this other supplier do not exceed the potential savings. Bic
Sanford would not travel from Iowa to China, for example, in order to save ten dollars on an
order. Thus, while substitution possibly affects pass-on, it does not surely do so.
38. This concept has to do with what economists call price elasticity of demand. See
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 17, § 2.4 (explaining that price elasticity of demand is the
percentage change in the quantity of a good demanded from a one-percent increase in the
good's price). For a pass-on of 100% to be possible without affecting sales, the demand for a
good must be completely inelastic. This means that for any percentage change in price, the
quantity demanded of a good would remain constant. A good example of inelastic goods may
be heart transplants. A heart transplant is a good that people generally purchase without regard
to cost (in the sense that cost does not generally impact the decision whether or not to have the
surgery). As such, an increase in the price of the procedure will have no effect on the number
of surgeries done. Further, if heart transplants fall in price, it is highly unlikely that people will
crowd local hospitals to undergo the rigorous procedure. Infinitely elastic markets, however,
have the opposite characteristics. In infinitely elastic markets, any change in the price of the
good will result in an infinite change in sales. In such a market, it would not be possible for
Intermediary Inc. to pass-on any overcharge without losing all of its sales. As such, it would just
have to accept a lower margin on its business transactions. Rt.
39. A demand curve is downward sloping if an increase in price causes the demand for die
product to decrease. A simple example can help illustrate this point. Imagine a pizza company
that offers a price of five dollars per pizza. Given this cheap price, it is likely that there will be a
high quantity of pizza demanded. Now imagine that the price per pizza increases to fifty dollars
per pizza. One would expect that only die-hard pizza fans would continue to purchase pizza and
that as such, the quantity of pizza demanded would fall. Thus, when the price of a good rises,
the quantity demanded falls. Application of this model to antitrust reveals that it is not clear
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revenue earned by charging the lower price is greater than the revenue
earned by charging the higher price, the direct purchaser will have suffered
a loss due
to the passed-on overcharge even if it passes on the entire
4
amount. 0
In addition to the complexities introduced when looking at the
downward-sloping demand curve and elasticity of demand, various other
factors interfere with a pure passing-on defense. 41 Thus, while the passing-on
defense has some merit under an overcharge method of measuring
damages, its operation is not as simple as assuming that the direct purchaser
42
will pass on 100% of an overcharge to its consumers without loss of profit.
3.

Offensive Pass-On

We have seen that monopolists may claim, as a defense in litigation, that
direct purchasers pass on alleged overcharges to indirect purchasers.
Indirect purchasers, then, may claim that they were harmed by this passedon amount. The term "offensive pass-on" refers to this claim-where an
indirect purchaser alleges antitrust injury due to overcharge passed on to it
by the direct purchaser. 4' The same difficulties arise with this claim,
however, as with the defensive use of pass-on. How does a court calculate
how much the indirect purchaser was harmed? This difficulty, and how the
courts have dealt with it, is the subject of the following section.

1II.

ANTITRUST INJURY: THE INDIRECT PURCHASER

DOCTRINE

The previous section discussed the concepts of offensive and defensive
pass-on. As discussed, these concepts may not be simple to put into practice.
This section will discuss how federal law, and ultimately state law, has dealt
(or not dealt) with these issues.

that a direct purchaser could raise the price of its product without losing some revenue. For
further discussion of the law of demand, see MICHAEL R. EDGMAND ET AL., ECONOMICS AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 43-46 (5th ed. 2001).

40.
This is a simplistic example that does not discuss the seller's cost curves. While the
seller's costs are important to this analysis in that reduced sales may not hurt the company if the
marginal cost exceeds the marginal revenue on those products, this in-depth treatment is not
necessary. Further, the basic premise still holds: a downward sloping demand curve
complicates, to some extent, the measurement of pass-on damages when using tise overcharge
method.
For a detailed discussion of the economics of pass-on, see generally Cooter, supra note
41.
35; Harris & Sullivan, supra note 35; Landes & Posner, supra note 35.

395a (discussing the complexity of
See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8,
42.
calculating the damages of indirect purchasers). But see generally Harris & Sullivan, supra note 35
(contending that 100% overcharge is likely in many cases).
43. 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supranote 8, 346, at 362.
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Federal antitrust standing under the Clayton Act extends to "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
44
Three major cases have shaped the
forbidden in the antitrust laws."
jurisprudence of indirect purchaser suits in the federal courts: Hanover Shoe,
45
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,46 and California
48
47
v. ARC America Corp. In the first of these cases, Hanover Shoe, the Supreme
Court took a step toward defining what parties are "injured" by antitrust
violations under federal law.
1.

HanoverShoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.

In 1968, Hanover Shoe brought suit against United Shoe, accusing it of
monopolization of the shoe machinery industry in violation of § 2 of the
4
Sherman Act. 9 Hanover Shoe, a shoe manufacturer, based its claim upon
United Shoe's sales practices, particularly its practice of "leasing and
'5
0
refusing to sell its more complicated and important shoe rnachinery."
Hanover Shoe sought the price differential between its rental expenses and
the expenses that it would have incurred had United Shoe been willing to
51
sell the "more complicated and important shoe machinery." United Shoe
countered, in part, by claiming that Hanover Shoe suffered no injury
because the price that Hanover Shoe charged its customers would have
included any such overcharge.5 2
53
The Court rejected United Shoe's pass-on defense. The Court first
recognized that "[a] wide range of factors influence a company's pricing
policies. " 5 4 The Court then noted the difficulties presented by attempting to
56
55
determine market conditions ex post, the price elasticity of demand, and
7
the behavior absent the alleged overcharge. The Court reasoned that if the

44. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
45. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
46. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
47. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
48. 392U.S. 481.
49. Id. at 483.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 483-84.
52. Id. at 487-88. This is the pass-on defense discussed in Part It.B.
53. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 492-95 ("We are not impressed with the argument that
sound laws of economics require recognizing this defense.").
54. Id at 492.
55. Id. at 492-93 (reasoning that a businessman would likely be unable to predict how a
change in supply, the applicable economic conditions, or the labor market would have affected
the price that he charged to consumers in the relevant time period).
56.
Id.at 493. For an explanation of price elasticity of demand, see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 17, § 2.4.
57. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493.
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pass-on defense were allowed, defendants would "retain the fruits of their
illegality" because individual indirect purchasers, who suffer relatively
minimal losses, would have little incentive to bring suit.5 Thus, the antitrust
remedy of treble damages would lose its deterrent effect. 59 Hanover Shoe,
then, precludes the use of the pass-on defense in federal court.
2.

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois

The Court decided Hanover Shoe's logical corollary, 60 Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,61 in 1977. This case involved a suit by the State of Illinois against a
manufacturer and distributor of concrete block. 2 The State did not buy the
block
the defendant, but rather the block traveled through
• directly
• • from
63
As such, this case was an attempt at using pass-on
intermediaries.
offensively; the State of Illinois depended on the theory that Illinois Brick's
illegal overcharge had been passed on to it through the distribution chain. 4
The Court thus faced the question of whether to allow offensive use of passon when Hanover Shoe clearly prohibited the defensive use of pass-on.
Both parties agreed that the rule regarding the use of pass-on should
apply equally. The Court, however, first considered the effect of allowing
offensive pass-on while maintaining the prohibition against the defensive use
of pass-on.' The Court noted concern with the possibility of multiple
liability under such a scenario. 66 It was clear to the Court that allowing

58.

Id. at 494.

Id. The Court did recognize exceptions to this general bar, however, in cases where
there is either a pre-existing cost-plus contract or where there is a price that must be charged by
law and no differential can be proven between that price and the overcharge price. Id. In these
cases, the direct purchaser is able to pass on the full amount of the overcharge. As such, the
direct purchaser has no need to bring suit while the indirect purchaser (who has faced the full
burden of the overcharge) does.
A cost-plus contract is "[a] contract in which payment is based on a fixed fee or a
percentage added to the actual cost incurred." BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 260 (Abridged 7th ed.

59.

2000). For example, a cost-plus contract in the Woodcorp example would provide that Bic
Sanford would buy X pencils from Intermediary Inc. for Intermediary Inc.'s cost plus eight
percent. In such a case, Bic Sanford would be required to pay an amount that reflected the
increased cost or be in breach of contract. Thus, the antitrust injury is completely passed on to
Bic Sanford and other buyers with cost-plus contracts.
60. See Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 222 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that Illinois
Brick is the logical corollary of Hanover Shoe); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
61. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 726.
Id.
Id. at 727.

65.
66.

Id. at 729-30.
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730.
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would result in antitrust
parties to use pass-on offensively but
67 not defensively
violators facing sextuple damages.
its68 Hanover Shoe
supporting
The Court then noted that the rationale
,
•
decision applied equally to defensive and offensive pass-on. Particularly,
9
the Court recognized that the difficulties of ex post analysis remained.' The
Court also declined to overrule its decision in Hanover Shoe that only direct70
the Clayton Act.
purchasers may be injured within the meaning of § 4 of
Given these determinations, the Court held that federal antitrust laws
prohibited the offensive use of pass-on. 7 '
3.

State Opposition to Illinois Brick Californiav. ARC America Corp.

72
States very clearly opposed the ruling in Illinois Brick After the
Supreme Court's decision, several states immediately passed laws allowing
73
indirect purchasers a cause of action under state law. These statutes raised
federal preemption issues, however, and the government challenged them
on that ground before the United States Supreme Court in Californiav. ARC
America Co"p.74
ARC America involved claims by Alabama, Arizona, California, and
Minnesota against ARC America alleging a nationwide conspiracy to fix the
price of cement. 75 A number of the states based their claims on state laws
allowing indirect purchaser actions. 76 As the litigation progressed, some of
in the case settled, which resulted in a settlement fund
the major defendants
77
of over $32 million.
The Arizona District Court barred the indirect purchasers from
collecting out of the fund, however, reasoning that the state statutes allowing
such claims were preempted by federal law and thus could not be given

67. Id, Assume that Woodcorp overcharged Intermediary Inc. by 100(u). Intermediary
Inc. then sells the product to Bic Sanford. Intermediary Inc. brings suit against Woodcorp

alleging a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. As Woodcorp cannot use a pass-on defense
against Intermediary Inc. (due to Hanover Shoe) a court may find Woodcorp liable to
Intermediary Inc. for 300(u). This is due to the treble damages provision of § 4 of the Clayton
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Further, Bic Sanford could bring suit against Woodcorp alleging the
same injury. If the Court allowed him to use pass-on offensively, then he could also receive
damages of 300(u). Thus, Woodcorp would end up paying 600(u) for one § 2 violation (300(u)
to both Intermediary Inc. and Bic Sanford).
68. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-35.
69. Id, at 731-32.
70. id at 729.
71. 1d. at 731-47.
72. See O'Connor, supra note 13, at 34 (stating that forty-seven states and the United States
filed amici curiae briefs in support of the plaintiff in Illinois Brick).
73. Id. at 34-35.
74. 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989).
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id at 97-98
77. Id. at 98-99.
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effect. 78 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision.7 9 The Ninth

Circuit held that allowing indirect purchaser suits under state law would
80
conflict with Illinois Brick and undermine its three policies.

The Ninth

Circuit thus held that federal law preempted state statutes that allowed
indirect purchaser suits.8 t
The Supreme Court heard the appeal from this decision in 1989 and
received amicus curiae briefs from thirty-five states advocating reversal of the
Ninth Circuit's decision-another example of the states' strong opposition
to Illinois Brick.82 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the rule of Illinois Brick prevented indirect purchasers from recovering
damages based upon state antitrust laws that expressly gave them the right to
use offensive pass-on.8 3 The Court held that it did not,8 4 reasoning that its
interpretation of federal antitrust statutes need not govern state antitrust
statutes:
It is one thing to consider the congressional policies identified in
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining what sort of recovery
federal antitrust law authorizes; it is something altogether different,
and in our view inappropriate, to consider them as defining what
federal law allows States to do under their own antitrust law.85
Further, the Court stated that "nothing in Illinois Brick suggests that it
would be contrary to congressional purposes for States to allow indirect
purchasers to recover under their own antitrust laws."8 6
With this decision, it became clear that states have the authority to grant
indirect purchasers a cause of action under state law for state antitrust
violations. As discussed earlier, however, parties
can use neither offensive
87
nor defensive pass-on under the Clayton Act.

78. Id. at 99.
79. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 99 (citing In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817
F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1987)).
80.
Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d at 1445. The three Illinois Brick policies were
identified as: (1)multiple liability; (2) complexity of litigation; and (3) incentive to sue. ARC
Am. Co., 490 U.S. at 99.
81.
Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d at 1447 ("We hold that the state law claims
in this case based on indirect purchases of cement that do not fall within any exception to the
rule of Illinois Brick are preempted .... ").
82.
Attorney
83.
84.

ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 95. Included among these briefs was one from Iowa's
General, Tom Miller.
Id. at 100.
Id.at 101.

85.

Id. at 103.

86.

Id.

87.

See supra Part III.A.1-2 (discussing the Supreme Court's rulings that prohibited the use

of offensive and defensive pass-on under the Clayton Act).
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IOWA LAW

While many states responded to Illinois Brick and ARC America by
implementing statutes that expressly authorize indirect purchasers to sue for
antitrust damages," Iowa did not follow this lead. Instead, Iowa continued to
use the Iowa Competition Law, 89 which was enacted two months prior to the
arguments in Illinois Brick.9 The Iowa Competition Law's prohibitions
essentially mirror those found in federal antitrust statutes."'
Iowa Code section 553.12 provides the statutory authority for suits
92
under the Iowa Competition Law. Notably, this section does not expressly
93
allow indirect purchaser suits. Further, Iowa Code section 553.2 states that
the Iowa Competition Law should be construed in harmony with the federal
laws. 94 Importantly, however, this section provides that "[t] his construction

88.
O'Connor, supra note 13, at 34-35 (stating that in 2001, nineteen states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico had statutes that permitted actions by or on behalf of indirect
purchasers).
89. IOWA CODE § 553.1-18 (2003). It is important to note, however, that in 2001, there was
a House Study Bill in Iowa that attempted to change IOWA CODE § 553.12. H.S.B. 93, 79th Gen.
Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001). This Bill would have expressly allowed for indirect purchaser
suits.
90. The Iowa Competition Law was passed on January 1, 1977. IOWA CODE § 553.1 (2003).
Illinois Brick was argued before the Court on March 23, 1977 and decided on June 9, 1977. IIl.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 720 (1977).
Iowa Code section 553.4 provides that "[a] contract, combination, or conspiracy
91.
between two or more persons shall not restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in a relevant
market." IOWA CODE § 553.4 (2003). This section closely parallels § 1 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Iowa Code section 553.5 states that "[a] person shall not attempt to establish or
establish, maintain, or use monopoly of trade or commerce in a relevant market for the
purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices." IOWA CODE
§ 553.5 (2003).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act imposes liability on "[elvery person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
92.
IOWA CODE § 553.12 (2003) (limiting potential claimants to "a person who is injured
or threatened with injury by conduct prohibited under this chapter"). Iowa Code section 553.3
defines the term "person" as "a natural person, estate, trust, enterprise or government agency."
Id. § 553.3.
93.
Cf MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.778 (2001) (allowing an action by those "injured directly
or indirectly"); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2004) (stating that damages are available to "[a]ny
person, any governmental body, or the state of Minnesota or any of its subdivisions or agencies,
injured directly or indirectly" (emphasis added)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (2001) ("[The
fact that a person or public body has not dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or
otherwise limit recovery.").
IOWA CODE § 553.2 (2003). Iowa Code section 553.2 provides:
94.
This chapter shall be construed to complement and be harmonized with the
applied laws of the United States which have the same or similar purpose as this
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shall not be made in such a way
as to constitute a delegation of state
"
95
authority to federal government.
The Iowa Competition Law also provides a statutory scheme for
damages that is different than the mandatory treble damages provided for
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Iowa Code section 553.12(2) only requires an
award of actual damages. Iowa courts have discretion, however, to award
.exemplary damages" that do not exceed twice the actual damages if the
defendant's conduct was "willful or flagrant."9 6 Thus, if a court exercises its
discretion to its fullest extent, it will award the equivalent of treble damages.
Given the ability to reach such a result, Iowa law allows for the same level of
damages as federal law, but also allows judges much more discretion in
awarding them.
While there are great similarities between the substantive provisions of
federal antitrust law and the Iowa Competition Law, it was unclear whether
Iowa barred indirect purchaser suits until Comes v. Microsoft Corp.97
IV.

COMES V. MICROSOFT CORP.

Comes began with a relatively mundane transaction: the purchase of a
computer. 98 Joe Comes purchased his computer through Gateway with
Windows 98 pre-installed on it.9 He later brought suit against Microsoft
Corp. alleging that Microsoft violated the Iowa Competition Law by illegally
maintaining and using a monopoly. 00 In doing so, Comes claimed Microsoft
injured him (an indirect purchaser) by charging Gateway an increased price
10 2
for the Windows 98 operating system 1-a classic use of offensive pass-on.
Microsoft filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing that federal
law controlled the Iowa Competition Law-thus barring indirect purchaser
suits. The district court agreed and held that the Iowa Competition Law

chapter. This construction shall not be made in such a way as to constitute a
delegation of state authority to the federal government, but shall be made to
achieve uniform application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of
economic activity and monopolistic practices.
Id.
95.
96.

Id. This provision is referred to as the "non-delegation" clause.
Id. § 553.12(3). The court cannot impose exemplary damages on the state, however.

Id.
97.
646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002). While there had been no judicial comment on this
question, the Iowa legislature had offered its insight. See H.S.B. 93, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess.
(Iowa 2001) (stating that "[c]urrent law allows only those who purchase direcdy from an
alleged antitrust violator to recover damages").
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 441.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id.
See supra Part 1.B.3 (discussing the concept of offensive pass-on).
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barred indirect purchasers from bringing suit.'"° The Supreme Court of
Iowa heard an appeal of this decision to determine whether the Iowa
Competition Law would be interpreted to follow Illinois Brick-and thus bar
104
Under a facial reading of the statute, the
indirect purchaser actions.
supreme court found no explicit limitation on indirect purchaser suits in the
Iowa Code, concluding that "the Iowa Competition Law creates a cause of
action for all consumers, regardless of one's technical status as a direct or
indirect purchaser." 10 5 Reaching this conclusion, however, forced the court
to determine the effect of the harmonization provision contained in section
553.2.106
In addressing this provision, the court stated that the statute does not
require "Iowa courts to interpret the Iowa Competition Law the same way
federal courts have interpreted federal law." 1 7 In fact, the section specifically
provides that "[t~his construction shall not be made in such a way as to
constitute a delegation of state authority to the federal government."'°s The
court also noted that "because Illinois Brick was a decision construing only
federal antitrust law, it did not define the connection, if any, between
federal and state antitrust laws. ""' 9 Given that the court did not feel bound
by Illinois Brick, it then focused on encouraging the "uniform application of
the state and federal laws prohibiting monopolistic practices. "110
In doing this, the court focused on the general purpose of state and
federal antitrust laws rather than on the limited issue of indirect purchaser
suits."I The purpose of these laws, as the court defined it, was not to
determine access to the courts for certain classes of individuals, but rather to
provide consistent standards for businesses so that they know what conduct
is prohibited."' In effectuating this purpose, the court did not feel
constrained to define who may bring an action in state court the same way
that federal courts had defined who may do so in their courts. 13
Following this logic, the court reasoned that granting indirect
purchasers access to the Iowa courts is not in conflict with federal law and

103.
104.
105.
felt that

Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 442.
Id.
1& at 445 (emphasis added). But see infta note 121 (explaining that the Iowa legislature
the Iowa Competition Law did not provide for indirect purchaser suits).

See supra note 94 (providing the text of this statute).
Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 446.
Id.(citing IOWA CODE § 553.2).
id
110. Id This goal was driven by Iowa Code section 553.2, which provides that the
construction of the harmonization statute "shall be made to achieve uniform application of the
state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of economic activity and monopolistic practices."
IOWA CODE § 553.2 (2003).
106.
107.
108.
109.

111.
112.
113.

Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 446.
Id.
Id.
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consequently is not in violation of the harmonization provision.' 14 The court
unequivocally stated that anyone injured by a violation of the state's antitrust
laws should have the right to bring suit 1 15 and that a contrary opinion would
"overwhelmingly defeat the purpose of the Iowa Competition Law. ' ' G
Through this reasoning, the court was able to allow indirect purchaser suits
in Iowa while remaining true to the harmonization provision of section
553.2.
The court went on to give one final justification for its holding. This
"final consideration"' 17 raised (and left unresolved) issues of importance in
Iowa antitrust law. The court reasoned that in order to give meaning to the
legislature's purpose for enacting the Iowa Competition Law, it was obliged
to take into account the state of the law at the time of the statute's
enactment.! 8 The court recognized that the Iowa Competition Law was
passed before the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick." 9 As such,
"[w]hen the Iowa legislature enacted the Iowa Competition Law, it did so
considering the federal law prior to Illinois Brick which allowed indirect
purchasers to bring antitrust suits." 2 ° Therefore, the court reasoned, the
status of federal law when the Iowa Competition Law was enacted supported
its interpretation of the legislature's intent and further justified
its ultimate
2
1
conclusion that indirect purchasers could sue under Iowa law.1
The court next minimized the policy concerns underlying Illinois Brick
as they related to state courts. 12 It then concluded by reasserting its position
that "[n]othing in the Iowa Competition Law or in federal antitrust law

114.
Id. at 447 ("The United States Supreme Court has held that two statutes, both of which
prohibit anticompetitive conduct, are not inconsistent merely because one allows indirect
purchasers to sue for damages while the other does not.").
115.
Id. ("Consumers in this state are best protected by permitting all injured purchasers to
bring suit against those who violate our antitrust laws.").
116,
Comes, 646 N.W. 2d at 447.

117.

Id.

118.
ld
119.
Id.
120. Id. at 448.
121.
Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 448. Apparently the court was not aware of, or did not feel
compelled to address, the 2001 House Study Bill of the Iowa legislature that stated that
"[c]urrent law allows only those who purchase directly from an alleged antitrust violator to
recover damages." H.S.B. 93, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001). Whether this legislative
interpretation of its own statute would have been convincing to the court is uncertain because
reference to it does not appear in the case. While this Note is not directed at critiquing the
ultimate holding in Comes, one can make a compelling argument that the court erred when
ascertaining the intent of the Iowa legislature in enacting the Iowa Competition Law. See Comes,
646 N.W.2d at 451-54 (Cady,J., dissenting) (noting great concern about the majority's analysis
of the legislature's intent).
122.
See Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 449-51 ("The Illinois Brick court was primarily concerned with
policy considerations which have not materialized as it envisioned actions in state court.").
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purchasers may not maintain an antitrust
requires us to find [that] indirect
2
1
action in Iowa state courts."1
V.

BEYOND COMES

Having looked at the Comes decision, this section will discuss some
specific effects of that decision on Iowa antitrust law. Parts A and B discuss
an apparent omission by the court in its analysis and how parties in antitrust
cases can argue the consequences of that omission. Parts C and D discuss
how a somewhat unique system may benefit Iowa. Finally, Part E cautions
other states not to make the Comes error.
A.

THE FORGOTTEN CASE: HANOVER SHOE

The Iowa Supreme Court failed to address one important element of
antitrust law in Comes. While focusing on Illinois Brick, the court neglected
Hanover Shoe and its implications. The court simply never addressed
defensive pass-on and its role within the Iowa Competition Law. This lack of
direction leaves direct purchasers that want to bring suit in Iowa in the
perilous position of being unable to evaluate their potential recovery due to
uncertainty as to what extent a potential defendant may be liable. By
introducing this uncertainty, the Iowa Supreme Court has made it more
costly, 124 and hence less attractive, for direct purchasers to enforce their
rights in Iowa.
Why did the court ignore such an important issue in Comes? One
possibility is that the court failed to address defensive pass-on because it was
so narrowly focused on the case at hand. 12 For instance, the court based its
decision to shift the incentive to sue onto indirect purchasers on the
statement that "[c]learly, direct purchasers such as Dell, Compaq, Gateway,
and IBM have not sued Microsoft for antitrust infringements.... The fact

123.
Id at 451.
124. The uncertainty surrounding defensive pass-on may raise the cost of bringing suit in
many ways. First, it may require more money to be spent on legal research into the issue. It will
also require more time by trained attorneys in arguing this point before courts. In addition,
there is more risk to bringing suit, and this risk can be translated into cost. Quite simply, if
direct purchasers are unsure of whether they can recover damages unhindered by defensive
pass-on, the expected return of the suit must be discounted by this uncertainty. This lowers the
anticipated return from suit and hence makes it less attractive to bring suit.
125.
It is plausible that the court knew that it was indicating that the Iowa Competition Law
did not allow defensive pass-on. In the absence of a specific statutory provision against multiple
liability, the court may have felt that such a result was appropriate. It is also possible that the
court did not address defensive pass-on because such a discussion could be classified as mere
dicta. This would be a strong argument for a proponent of defensive pass-on.
It is this author's conclusion, however, that defensive pass-on is so inextricably
intertwined with indirect purchaser suits that the court would have felt compelled to address it
if it had thought of the issue. Indeed, as Illinois Brick, Hanover Shoe, and their progeny have
shown, these concepts are so tied together that a discussion of one necessitates discussion of the
other.
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that no direct purchaser has yet sued Microsoft for antitrust violations
suggests that no direct purchaser will do so." 2 6 While it may be true in this
case, or even this type of case, 127 that direct purchasers are unlikely to sue
their suppliers, 2 8 it was rather short-sighted for the court to halt its analysis
there. The court did not go as far as to say that no direct purchasers will ever
sue a monopolist in Iowa. How then will the court respond to claims of
defensive pass-on in these situations?
B.

THERE IS SUPPORTIN COMES FORA PRoHIBITIoN oFDEENSIVEPASS-ON

In light of the relationship between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the
logical corollary to Comes would seem to be the granting of the use of
defensive pass-on. 129 However, as discussed above, the Comes court never took
this step. It never determined whether Iowa law allowed the use of defensive
pass-on. An advocate for defensive pass-on could surely argue that the
relationship between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick naturally extends to
Comes. As such, the argument would go, Iowa law allows the use of pass-on
defensively.
A strong argument can be made, however, that Comes signaled the
opposite-that the Iowa Competition Law prohibits defensive pass-on. As
discussed in Part IV, the court reasoned that the Iowa Competition Law
incorporated the state of federal law as it stood at the time of its adoption,
prior to Illinois Brick.13 1 What the court failed to note, however, was that
federal law also prohibited defensive pass-on at that time. Hanover Shoe, decided
in 1968, effectively cut off such use.' 3 ' Arguably then, the Iowa Competition

126.
Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 450.
127. The type of case referred to is one where the direct purchasers are so economically
reliant upon their relationship with the monopolist that they are unable to bring suit against
the monopolist. While it may seem that this would be the case in any situation with a
monopolist, it does not necessarily follow. There may be instances where a direct purchaser can
shift its product line to exclude the product and thus is not worried about the loss of the
relationship.
This does not appear to be true in the Microsoft cases, however, because companies
such as Dell and Gateway offer such a limited service-computers and computer services. As
such, they seem unable to shift their product line away from Microsoft and thus have a
significant interest in not upsetting the relationship. See id.("[D]irect purchasers likely will not
enforce antitrust laws out of fear of retaliation by their suppliers, such as Microsoft-the sole
supplier of a popular operating system."). Thus, it seems highly unlikely that Gateway will ever
sue Microsoft for antitrust violations.
128.
Even the Illinois Brick court recognized this danger, stating that "[wle recognize that
direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of
disrupting relations with their suppliers." Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
129. This is essentially the mirror image of the relationship between Hanover Shoe and
Illinois
Brick.
130.
Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 447 ("Because Iowa took its cues from federal law in creating our
state antitrust statute, the federal law before Illinois Brick is instructive.").
131.

See supra Part III.A.1.
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Law incorporated the prohibition of Hanover Shoe. Under this reading of
Comes, Iowa law would now allow offensive, but not defensive, pass-on.
Further strengthening a conclusion that Comes supports a prohibition of
defensive pass-on, the court recognized the possibility of multiple damages,
but continued in its decision undeterred.132 The court first cited legislation
in other states that avoids similar concerns. 3 The court, for example, cited
an Illinois law that provided that "the court shall take all steps necessary to
avoid duplicative liability for the same injury.""" Many states that allow
indirect purchaser suits take this approach.'2 5 Without explanation, the
court did not opine that such laws were necessary in Iowa. Rather, the court
again focused on the limited factual circumstances before it and determined
that multiple liability was not a concern. 3 6 It is unclear whether this was due
to mere oversight or if it was a conscious judicial decision. Either way, there
is now an arguable void in Iowa antitrust law.
To the extent that the court did show concern for multiple liability, it
was only in the context of federal recovery coupled with state recovery-not
duplicative state recovery.137 The court simply did not show concern about
the potential for sextuple damages resulting from this inconsistent
application of pass-on liability in Iowa. The court did note, however, that the
district courts "are fully capable of ensuring antitrust defendants are not
forced to pay more in damages than amounts to which the injured parties are
entitled. " ' Quite significantly, this statement does not mandate that district
courts limit damages to treble the overcharge. Rather, it evidences an
extreme confidence in district court judges' abilities to apportion damages
and to determine the amount of damages that injured parties are entitled
to. Thus, a district court could determine that the injured parties are
entitled to the multiple damages' 9 that may result from an inconsistent
application of pass-on liability.
132, Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 449 ("However, given the facts of the case before us, the concern
of multiple liability is unfounded.").
133. Idat449n.11.
134. Id. (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 1997)). The court also noted a
South Dakota law that stated that "the court may take any steps necessary to avoid duplicative
recovery." Id. (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (enacted in 1980)).
135. Id.; see also Ronald W. Davis, Indirect PurchaserLitigation:ARC America's Chickens Come
Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wal 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 391-93 (1997) (discussing states
that have specific provisions regarding multiple liability); Report of the American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme Court's Decision in California v. ARC
American Corp., 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 273 app. A (1990) [hereinafter Task ForceReport].
136.
See Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 449 (dismissing multiple-liability concerns).
137.
Id. at 450 ("Even assuming such danger of multiple liability exists, there is no federal
policy against states imposing liability in addition to that imposed under federal law.").
138.
Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added).
139. "Multiple damages" would occur when both direct and indirect purchasers recovered
the same part of the overcharge. An example of this would be where an indirect purchaser
proves that he was injured by a 100% pass-on and recovers treble damages under parts one and
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While this interpretation of the Comes decision seems perhaps unfair at
first, such a system is not without support. In fact, the dissent in Illinois Brick
commented on this approach.1 40 Adoption of this interpretation of Comes,
however, will likely require that courts be convinced that there are benefits
to such a system.
C. ALLOWING OFFENSIVEPASS-ON BUT NOT DPENSrV PASS-ON HAS BFNFMN

While a system allowing offensive but not defensive pass-on may have
benefits, this system is not optimal. Numerous commentators have discussed
the severe problems with Illinois Brick and its progeny. 141 Comes did not solve
any of these fundamental problems with the doctrine. Time has shown,
however, that change in the doctrine is not occurring, or is doing so very
slowly. Thus, states must work within this system for the time being. While we
cannot yet make lemonade
from Illinois Brick's lemons, we can improve our
2
14
current situation.

One benefit of the interpretation of Comes that is advocated here is that
it helps to eliminate one incentive for direct purchasers to forum shop.
Under the current system, direct purchasers can sue in federal court and are

two of section 553.12 of the Iowa Code. Subsequently, a direct purchaser could bring suit
unhindered by defensive pass-on. The court in that case could also treble the damages, thus
bringing the damages tally up to six times the amount of the overcharge.
140. Il. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 753 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Brennan clearly stated his belief that the rule regarding pass-on need not apply
consistently to offensive and defensive use. Brennan stated that:
Despite the superficial appeal of the argument that Hanover Shoe should be applied
"consistently," thus precluding plaintiffs and defendants alike from proving that
increased costs were passed along the chain of distribution, there are sound
reasons for treating offensive and defensive passing-on cases differently. The
interests at stake in "offensive" passing-on cases, where the indirect purchasers sue
for damages for their injnries, are simply not the same as the interests at stake in
the Hanover Shoe, or "defensive" passing-on situation. There is no danger in this
case, for example, as there was in Hanover Shoe, that the defendant will escape
liability and frustrate the objectives of the treble-damages action. Rather, the same
policies of insuring the continued effectiveness of the treble-damages action and
preventing wrongdoers from retaining the spoils of their misdeeds favor allowing
indirect purchasers to prove that overcharges were passed on to them. Hanover Shoe
thus can and should be limited to cases of defensive assertion of the passing-on
defense to antitrust liability, where direct and indirect purchasers are not parties in
the same action.
Id
141.
See sources cited supra note 135 (offering but a glimpse into the scholarship
confronting the law surrounding indirect purchaser suits).
142.
The proper analysis of the system advocated by this Note is not to compare it to an
optimal solution to the indirect purchaser problem. Rather, this Note's proposal must be
analyzed against the status quo. Against this backdrop, it does offer advantages. While we wait
for further reform, the system advocated by this Note offers something more than what we have
now.
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not subject to the pass-on defense. 43 This action is logical-it maximizes
their recovery potential. Indirect purchasers, then, bring suit where they
can-state court. In that forum, indirect purchasers who can prove a 100%
pass-on can recover treble the overcharge as well. As such, the "system"
already allows multiple damages. 144 What the Comes decision adds is that it
reduces the incentive for direct purchasers to turn to federal court. If they
are not limited by defensive pass-on in state court, then potential recovery
145
This
should not influence the potential plaintiff's choice of forum.
reduction in forum shopping, alone, is a positive effect of the Comes
decision.
Going further, this may also reduce duplicative court expenses. If direct
and indirect purchasers join their actions in state court, the burden on the
courts is reduced. If direct and indirect purchasers can proceed in the same
action, without jeopardizing their recovery, then there is no need to run two
separate trials. 146 Given the complexity of antitrust trials, this could help to
alleviate some burden on an already busy federal court system.
As perhaps the greatest benefit, a system that prohibits defensive passon but allows offensive pass-on would presumably maximize enforcement
efforts. First, direct purchasers would be more likely to sue if their claim was
not subject to the pass-on defense. 47 Second, indirect purchaser suits would
not be deterred in any way because indirect purchasers would still be
allowed to use pass-on offensively.
Finally, allowing a greater range of damages gives courts the power to
adequately punish and deter socially harmful behavior. 14 While these
benefits exist, they must be balanced against the risk of over-deterrence.
Courts awarding high levels of damages could easily deter socially beneficial
behavior. Thus, Iowa courts must be able to use great discretion in awarding
damages if the Iowa Competition Law is construed to allow sextuple
damages.

143.

See Task Force Report, supra note 135, at 238.

144.
See id (describing this possibility).
145. This is not to say that forum shopping would be completely eliminated. Many
differences between state and federal courts still remain and would influence this choice.
Of course juries and their awards may be impacted by the seeming unfairness: why
146.
should two different parties receive the entire overcharge amount? This danger, while real,
could be avoided or mitigated with careful jury instructions.
147. As discussed in Part II.B.2, the calculations involved with a pass-on defense are by no
means easy or uncontroversial. Thus, the removal of this issue from litigation would make such
suits less costly and more attractive to direct purchasers. This is in accord with the Cones court's
argument that the difficulty of apportioning damages should not interfere with the rights of
victims to recover. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 450-51 (Iowa 2002) ("[Wle
should not defeat the ends ofjustice simply because the litigation may be complicated.").
148. This benefit is perhaps most persuasive to those who feel that treble damages are not
adequate to remedy most antitrust violations. See sources cited supra note 22 (discussing the
adequacy of treble damages).
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WouLD ALLOW SUCHA SYSTEM TO WORK

The prohibition of defensive pass-on coupled with the allowance of
offensive pass-on could lead to sextuple damages. 49 While mandatory
sextuple damages in antitrust cases would clearly be harmful, the Iowa Code
does not mandate this result. To the contrary, under the Iowa Competition
Law, Iowa judges have wide discretion in crafting damages awards. 50
The Woodcorp example15 1 illustrates the potential benefits of Iowa's
current system. Consider a situation where Intermediary Inc. brings suit and
recovers damages from Woodcorp.' 52 As Woodcorp would not have the
benefit of defensive pass-on, it would be liable for the full amount of the
overcharge. In determining the amount of damages to award under the
system introduced by this Note, the court would consider factors such as (1)
the possibility that indirect purchasers will bring suit, and (2) the amount of
damages that Woodcorp actually caused. If the court determines that
individual indirect purchasers have little to gain from filing suit, that an
award of treble damages would reflect the damage caused, and that the facts
of the case meet the elements of Iowa Code section 553.12(3), it could
award exemplary damages to reflect this determination.
The major danger that would remain, however, is that indirect
purchasers might subsequently bring suit, potentially exposing Woodcorp to
greater liability than the district court judge felt was appropriate. This
concern is mitigated, however, by the fact that the first judge's
determination that indirect purchasers would not bring suit would have
been influenced by a low rate of probable recovery for such purchasers.
Further, under the Iowa Code, exemplary damages would not be required.'5

149.
See supra note 139 (explaining how an award could reach sextuple damages).
150. See supra Part III.B (noting that Iowa law gives judges the discretion to award
exemplary damages up to twice the amount of actual damages). The 2001 proposed changes to
the Iowa Competition Law would have eliminated this discretion. The relevant portion of the
changed text would have been as follows:
1. The state or a person who is injured or threatened with injury by conduct
prohibited under this chapter may bring suit:

b. To recover three times the actual damages resulting from conduct prohibited
under this chapter, and the cost of suit, including, but not limited to, reasonable
attorney fees.
H.S.B. 93, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001). This change clearly would have resulted in
mandatory treble damages. As of the current Iowa Code, however, the Iowa legislature has not
changed this section of the Code.
151.
See supra Part I.
152. This example assumes that the parties have not made use of, or the court has not
required, a consolidated trial.
153.
IoWA CODE § 553.12(3) (2003).
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Thus, any recovery in such a second lawsuit should be minimal. If, however,
the judge in the second case determines that the actual damages caused by
the conduct exceed the amount awarded in the first case, she would have
the discretion to award exemplary damages to reflect that fact.
Looking more generally, a judge facing a damages calculation in a
direct purchaser suit 15 4 would do a calculation similar to that indicated by
the following formula: A=Do-(D,p) (X). The variable "A" equals the damages
award to the direct purchaser. This is what the judge will ultimately award,
taking into account the jury's award.' The variable "D," represents the ideal
total damages penalty imposed on the monopolist, taking into account
deterrence. "D,," represents the damages imposed on the indirect
purchasers, and the variable "X" is equal to the probability of such indirect
purchasers bringing suit. This "X" would be a function of the perceived
likelihood of success and the likely recovery in such a suit versus the costs of
bringing the suit. Naturally, as the two former values rise, "X" will rise.
While the amount derived from this formula would not necessarily
equal the damages award, it would allow the judge to determine the
appropriate level of exemplary damages to award the direct purchaser in
such a situation. If the amount calculated met or exceeded treble the
damages awarded by the jury, and the facts of the case allowed exemplary
damages, the judge could award the maximum amount allowed under the
statute. While this procedure seems complicated, district court judges, we
assume, "are fully capable" of making these determinations. 156
This system would allow judges a much greater role in shaping antitrust
liability to fit the actual damages caused. Thus, damages awards may more
accurately reflect the harm caused, resulting in better deterrence. While this
result may be an unintended consequence of the court's narrowly focused
decision in Comes, it has given Iowa an opportunity to experiment with a new
solution to the indirect purchaser dilemma. And as this section has shown,
this new solution need not result in over-deterrence.
E.

BEYOND IOWA: A LESSON FOR STATES IN SEARCH OFDOCTRINE

In addition to the problems discussed above, the Comes decision has
ramifications that extend beyond Iowa and its antitrust law. States that have

154. The following formula would also work in indirect purchaser suits. The references to
the parties need only be switched when looking at the variables. The important point is that the
judge in the first suit would need to apply this type of formula when the first party (direct
purchasers or indirect purchasers) brings suit. This issue could also be eliminated by the
consolidation of cases, but that is outside of the scope of this Note.
155. A judge cannot award this amount if it exceeds treble the jury's award. In these
situations, the judge would award treble thejury's award instead of "A."
See supra text accompanying note 138. While the introduction of formulas may make
156.
some cringe, the formula merely represents the variables that one would normally weigh in
such a decision.
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not yet interpreted their antitrust statutes, or those that will reconsider their
prior decisions, must beware of the faulty analysis involved in Comes. Courts
simply cannot rely on statutes enacted prior to Illinois Brick without paying
attention to Hanover Shoe. While the Iowa Competition Law gives district
courts the necessary discretion to make such a system work, other states may
not have such advantageous antitrust provisions.
A recent article surveying the "national movement toward indirect
purchaser standing " " 7 highlights the apparent appeal of, and hence danger
of, the Comes logic. The article seems to advocate for the adoption of the
Comes error by other states.
In arguing that certain states should extend
the right to sue to indirect purchasers, the author writes that "[b]ecause
these states' legislatures likely, if not certainly, considered the federal courts'
Sherman Act construction when they created their own antitrust acts, their
acts' constructions had to resemble that which existed when they were
enacted; namely, a construction allowing indirect purchaser claims."' 59 In
fact, the author applies this logic to four states that enacted their relevant
statutes after Hanover Shoe.'6 0 The author, however, does not mention
HanoverShoe. This is precisely the error that the Comes court made.
Courts that are interpreting their statutes must be cognizant of Hanover
Shoe. These states must avoid the Comes error-an error that appears to have
already crept from judicial decisions to law review articles. Perpetuation of
this error will not make it correct, it will only put other states in the position
that Iowa now faces-uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION

The indirect purchaser problem has evoked comment from the
judiciary, the academy, and practitioners. The problems introduced by
Illinois Brick are numerous and cannot all be tackled in a Note such as this.
One discrete problem that can be addressed was presented in Comes v.
Microsoft. In that decision, the Iowa Supreme Court, in its determination to
give indirect purchasers the right to sue, left defensive pass-on-and Hanover
Shoe-without a thought. 16 ' That decision warrants two considerations.
One is a cautionary tale applicable to state courts that have yet to
examine their antitrust statutes (or have already done so, but incorrectly).
Courts cannot ignore Hanover Shoe. While most of the arguments
surrounding indirect purchaser standing revolve around Illinois Brick,

157. Daniel R. Karon, "Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall!" The National
Movement Toward Indirect PurchaserAntitrust Standing and ConsumerJustice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1351, 1351 (2004).
158.
Id. at 1392-95.
159.
Id. at 1398.
160.
Id. at 1398 n.300 (citing statutes from Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, and New
Hampshire that were all enacted after Hanover Shoe).
161.
See generally Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002).
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Hanover Shoe has a voice too. Courts facing this issue should address Hanover
Shoe and its implications. It is important that courts address this matter so
that litigants know the system that they are working under.
The second consideration is the major focus of this Note. While the
Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Comes seems incomplete, this oversight
does not necessarily require immediate action. Absent further intervention,
it allows judges great discretion to craft antitrust remedies that adequately
reflect the damages imposed by antitrust violators. While this Note does not
undertake the task of weighing the broad range of costs and benefits of this
approach, it does recognize that it is not fundamentally inconsistent with the
policies behind the Iowa Competition Law. It maximizes enforcement effort
and allows all parties injured by illegal action to enforce their rights.
Absent a shift towards the lost profit model, 62 or further reform in the
indirect purchaser doctrine, this approach provides a system of damages that
may most adequately reflect the damages caused by an antitrust violator
while remaining mindful of the risk of over-deterrence. Thus, while Comes
seems like an incomplete decision, it may have inadvertently opened the
door to a fresh approach to an old antitrust problem. Comes allows Iowa to
move beyond treble damages.

162. For a discussion of the lost profits model and whether this model is preferred, see
supra note 8.
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